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Abstract:	 The	 South	 African	 Constitution	 affirms	 “the	 democratic	 values	 of	 human	 dignity,	 equality	 and	
freedom”.	 The	 Constitutional	 Court	 in	 Johannesburg	was	 established	 as	 a	 key	 institution	 in	 South	 Africa’s	
new	democracy.	Built	on	the	site	of	a	former	prison,	the	Court	is	not	only	distinctive	architecturally	including	
integrated	artworks	in	the	fabric	of	the	building,	it	is	a	unique	space	by	international	comparison	because	it	
houses	a	 large	visual	art	collection	developed	by	and	for	the	Court—the	core	theme	of	which	 is	respect	for	
human	 dignity.	 Drawing	 on	 six	 months	 fieldwork	 at	 the	 Constitutional	 Court—which	 included	 fifty-four	
interviews	 with	 judges,	 staff,	 artists,	 advocates,	 and	 visitors	 to	 the	 Court—this	 paper	 examines	 the	
connections	between	human	dignity	and	art	at	the	Court.	The	aim	is	to	investigate	whether	the	realisation	of	
human	dignity	by	the	Court,	 is	disconnected	from	the	aesthetics	of	the	art	collection.	Is	the	performance	of	
dignity	in	the	art	collection	a	utopian	ideal,	achievable	objective,	or	unrealised	potential?	The	art	collection	is	
a	kind	of	visual	jurisprudence	which	responds	to,	but	also	comprises,	conceptions	of	human	dignity	as	a	right,	
a	value	and	a	touchstone	of	democracy—conceptions	which	are	closely	entwined	with	South	Africa’s	human	
rights	governance,	but	that	manifest	 in	very	different	ways.	The	collection	envisages	the	 journey	to	human	
dignity	as	ongoing;	it	is	promised	but	remains	ungraspable.	In	this	way,	the	Court	is	simultaneously	a	‘good	
place’—a	site	constituting	human	dignity—and	a	‘no	place’,	a	prospect	yet	to	be	realised—a	sight	of	human	
dignity.	This	tension	is	important	in	calibrating	an	idea	of	human	dignity	within	a	transitioning	human	rights	
discourse	in	South	Africa.	*	
	
1. Introduction	
 	
All	human	beings	are	born	free	and	equal	in	dignity	and	rights.		
—	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights1	
	
[R]ecognition	of	the	inherent	dignity	and	of	the	equal	and	inalienable	rights	of	all	members	of	the	
human	 family	 is	 the	 foundation	 of	 freedom,	 justice	 and	 peace	 in	 the	world…	 these	 rights	 derive	
from	the	inherent	dignity	of	the	human	person.			
—	 International	 Covenant	 on	 Civil	 and	 Political	 Rights	 and	 International	 Covenant	 on	 Economic,	
Social	and	Cultural	Rights2		
	
Everyone	has	inherent	dignity	and	the	right	to	have	their	dignity	respected	and	protected.		
—	South	African	Bill	of	Rights3		
 	
Inside	the	Constitutional	Court	in	Johannesburg	hangs	Humanity	(fig.	1).	In	this	tapestry	by	Joseph	
Ndlovu,	eight	figures	are	woven	together;	huddled,	with	closed	eyes,	their	faces	merge,	their	arms	
embrace	 in	 waves	 of	 thread.	 In	 1994	 Constitutional	 Court	 Judges,	 Albie	 Sachs	 and	 Yvonne	
Mokgoro,	commissioned	the	tapestry	with	the	 intention	that	 it	would	reflect	“the	humanity	and	
                                                 
*	I	would	like	to	thank	my	supervisor,	Dr	Duncan	Bell,	and	Dr	Sharath	Srinivasan,	Dr	David	Blunt	and	the	editorial	team	of	
this	working	 paper	 series,	 for	 their	 invaluable	 reviews,	 comments	 and	 guidance	 on	 this	 paper.	 Thank	 you	 also	 to	 Dr	
Benjamin	Authers	and	participants	in	the	‘Utopias	of	Human	Rights’	workshop	at	the	Australian	National	University	for	
their	engagement	with	this	paper.	This	work	was	kindly	supported	by	the	Cambridge	Political	Economy	Society	Trust;	the	
Centre	 of	 Governance	 and	 Human	 Rights	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Cambridge	 and	 the	 Centre	 for	 Human	 Rights	 and	 the	
Institute	for	 International	and	Comparative	Law	in	Africa	at	the	University	of	Pretoria,	through	a	grant	from	the	David	
and	 Elaine	 Potter	 Foundation;	 the	 Department	 of	 Politics	 and	 International	 Studies	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Cambridge;	
Queens’	College	Cambridge;	and	the	Smuts	Memorial	Fund,	managed	by	the	University	of	Cambridge	in	memory	of	Jan	
Christiaan	Smuts.	
1	Article	1	of	United	Nations,	'The	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights',	
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a1>,	accessed	May	2015. 
2	United	Nations,	'International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights',	
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>,	accessed	May	2015,	United	Nations,	'International	
Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights',	<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx>,	
accessed	May	2015.
 
3	Article	10	of	Constitutional	Assembly,	'Bill	of	Rights',	
<http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng-02.pdf>,	accessed	May	2015.	
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social	 interdependence	 that	 underlay	 the	 [South	 African]	 Bill	 of	 Rights.”4	 Twenty	 years	 later—a	
little	faded	by	exposure	to	time	and	light—Humanity	still	hangs	at	the	Court,	capturing	a	moment	
in	South	Africa’s	transition	from	apartheid	to	constitutional	democracy,	where	the	recognition	of	
humanity	bore	the	promise	of	a	future	shaped	by	rights	and	dignity.	
	
The	Constitutional	Court	is	not	only	distinctive	architecturally	including	integrated	artworks	in	the	
fabric	of	 the	building,	 it	 is	a	unique	space	by	 international	comparison	because	 it	houses	a	 large	
visual	 art	 collection	 developed	 by	 and	 for	 the	 Court—the	 core	 theme	 of	 which	 is	 respect	 for	
human	dignity:	“At	the	core	of	the	Bill	of	Rights	and	of	the	artistic	endeavour	represented	in	the	
Court	is	respect	for	human	dignity.	It	is	this	that	unites	art	and	justice.”5	The	purpose	of	this	paper	
is	to	look	at	the	connections	between	human	dignity	and	art	at	the	Constitutional	Court.	The	aim	is	
to	investigate	whether	the	intentional	space	of	human	dignity	at	the	Court,	 is	disconnected	from	
the	aesthetics	of	 the	art	 collection.	 Is	 the	performance	of	dignity	 in	 the	art	 collection	a	utopian	
ideal,	achievable	objective,	or	unrealised	potential?		
 	
The	 art	 collection—as	 I	 argue	 throughout	 the	 paper—is	 a	 kind	 of	 visual	 jurisprudence	 which	
responds	 to,	 but	 also	 comprises,	 conceptions	 of	 human	 dignity	 as	 a	 right,	 a	 value,	 and	 a	
touchstone	 of	 democracy—conceptions	 which	 are	 closely	 entwined	 with	 South	 Africa’s	 human	
rights	governance,	but	that	manifest	in	very	different	ways.	At	the	same	time	that	human	dignity	
becomes	realised	by	the	spatial	transformation	of	the	site	of	the	Court,	it	paradoxically	remains	in	
the	art	collection	something	that	must	ever	be	worked	towards,	beyond	the	limits	of	the	Court.	In	
the	 artworks	 and	 the	 art	 collection,	 the	 journey	 to	 human	 dignity	 is	 envisaged	 as	 ongoing;	 it	
remains	 ungraspable.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 Court	 is	 simultaneously	 a	 utopian	 ‘good	 place’—a	 site	
constituting	 human	 dignity—and	 a	 utopian	 ‘no	 place’,	 a	 prospect	 yet	 to	 be	 realised—a	 sight	 of	
human	 dignity.	 This	 tension	 is	 important	 in	 calibrating	 an	 idea	 of	 human	 dignity	 within	 a	
transitioning	human	rights	discourse	in	South	Africa.		
 	
The	paper	arises	out	of	six	months	fieldwork	at	the	Constitutional	Court	spent	researching	the	art	
collection	 and	 its	 archive,	 conducting	 semi-structured	 interviews	 with	 people	 involved	 in	 the	
collection—including	 former	and	current	 judges,	members	of	 the	art	committee,	 the	collection’s	
curators,	 law	 clerks,	 artists,	 Court	 staff,	 and,	 visitors	 to	 the	 Court—and,	 being	 a	 participant-
observer	in	the	life	of	the	Court.	Nearly	all	of	the	fifty-four	people	interviewed	spoke	about	the	art	
collection	 as	 being	 connected	 to	 human	 dignity,	 humanity,	 ubuntu	 (humanness),	 and	 human	
understanding.6	These	terms	were	often	used	interchangeably.		
 	
Section	one	briefly	explores	the	concept	of	human	dignity	as	it	manifests	as	a	value,	a	right,	and	a	
touchstone	of	democracy;	focusing	on	the	political	trajectory	that	underlies	the	promise	of	human	
dignity	 in	 South	 Africa.	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 human	 dignity	 in	 human	 rights	 discourse	 is	
connected	 in	 some	 ways	 to	 the	 indigenous	 African	 concept	 of	 ubuntu—a	 concept	 that	 is	
fundamental	to	the	way	in	which	the	Constitutional	Court	was	founded	and	realised.	Section	two	
introduces	the	Constitutional	Court	as	a	key	institution	in	the	‘new’	South	Africa.	Built	on	the	site	
of	 former	 notorious	 prisons,	 the	 Court	 is	 both	 physically	 and	 symbolically	 significant,	 being	
tangibly	connected	to	the	past	from	which	it	steers	the	country’s	constitutional	future.	This	spatial	
transformation,	combined	with	the	dignity	jurisprudence	emerging	from	the	Court,	makes	it	a	site	
of	human	dignity,	where	human	dignity	is	intentionally	realised	and	actively	shaped.		
 	
                                                 
4	Bronwyn	Law-Viljoen	and	Ben	Law-Viljoen,	Art	and	Justice:	The	Art	of	the	Constitutional	Court	of	South	Africa	(D.	Krut,	
2008)	at	19.	
5	Ibid.,	at	30.	
6	Interviews	were	conducted	between	June	to	November	2014	in	South	Africa.	
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Section	three	 introduces	the	Court’s	art	collection	as	a	new	kind	of	visual	 jurisprudence	through	
which	it	is	possible	to	understand	how	the	art	collection	shapes,	and	has	the	potential	to	intervene	
in,	the	conception	of	human	dignity	emanating	from	the	Court.	The	artworks	play	a	role	in	framing	
human	dignity	as	still	 to	be	realised;	an	ongoing	utopia	 ‘out	there’.	This	unfurling	human	dignity	
sits	 in	 tension	with	 the	 site	 of	 the	 Court	 as	 an	 extant	 place	 of	 human	 dignity.	 In	 section	 four	 I	
analyse	three	individual	artworks—History	by	Dumile	Feni,	Judith	Mason’s	The	man	who	sang	and	
the	woman	who	kept	silent,	and	Twenty	six	punishment	cells	and	lavatory,	Number	Four,	Hillbrow,	
Johannesburg,	 32	 December	 1999	 by	 David	 Goldblatt—in	 order	 to	 examine	 how	 these	 works	
conceptualise	 human	 dignity.7	 As	 sights	 of	 human	 dignity	 the	 artworks	 respond	 to,	 but	 also	
comprise,	 ideas	 of	 human	 dignity	 which	 are	 closely	 entwined	with	 South	 Africa’s	 human	 rights	
governance.		
 	
2. Human	dignity	in	South	Africa’s	human	rights	discourse		
 	
The	 United	 Nations	 General	 Assembly	 adopted	 the	 Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights	
(UNDHR)	 in	1948;	South	Africa	abstained	from	this	adoption.8	That	same	year,	 the	South	African	
National	 Party—the	 architects	 of	 apartheid—came	 into	 power.	 Between	 1948	 and	 1994	 the	
segregation	of	‘races’	was	institutionalised	in	South	Africa,	resulting	in	violent	oppression	and	the	
systematic	 violations	 of	 human	 rights.	 Speaking	 from	 the	 dock	 during	 the	 Rivonia	 Trial	 in	 1964	
Nelson	Mandela	emphasised	the	fight	against	the	lack	of	human	dignity	in	South	Africa:		
 	
…we	fight	against	two	features	which	are	the	hallmarks	of	African	life	in	South	Africa	and	
which	are	entrenched	by	legislation,	which	we	seek	to	have	repealed.	These	features	are	
poverty	and	lack	of	human	dignity.9		
 	
Thirty	 years	 later—in	 1994—human	 dignity	 became	 a	 hallmark	 of	 South	 Africa	 for	 a	 different	
reason	 when	 the	 interim	 constitution—containing	 the	 first	 iteration	 of	 the	 country’s	 Bill	 of	
Rights—stated	that	“[e]very	person	shall	have	the	right	to	respect	for	and	protection	of	his	or	her	
dignity.”10	In	the	same	year,	Mandela	re-affirmed	this	right:	
 	
                                                 
7	It	is	important	note	at	this	point	that	the	Court’s	art	collection	inhabits	a	paradox	between	inviting	different	voices	to	
be	 expressed	 and	 selecting	which	 voices	 are	 heard,	 or	 in	 practice	 seen.	On	 the	 one	 hand	 the	 collection	was	 formed	
primarily	by	donations—donations	from	artists,	collectors,	and	patrons.	The	idea	that	the	‘collection	collected	itself’	was	
often	 stated	 in	 interviews	 as	 a	way	 in	which	 the	 art	 collection	 inhabits	 a	 democratic	 energy	 of	 the	 immediate	 post-
apartheid	period.	Those	with	the	ability—financial,	artistic—to	donate	gave	artworks	to	the	Court,	the	majority	of	which	
were	accepted	in	the	early	stages	of	the	collection’s	development.	This	open	practice	of	collecting	means	the	Court’s	art	
collection	 is	 diverse	 and	 eclectic.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 evolving	 curatorial	 policy	 of	 the	 collection	 focuses	 on	 the	
artworks	 being	 connected	 to	 human	dignity—in	 later	 years	 this	 policy	 has	 been	more	 closely	 followed	 than	 at	 other	
times.	In	practice	this	means	that	some	donations	are	not	accepted	on	the	basis	that	the	artwork	does	not	fit	with	ideas	
of	human	dignity	or	the	funding	is	not	available	to	care	for	the	artwork;	participation	is	thus	limited.	While	this	paradox	
is	 not	 unusual	 in	 art	 collections	 and	 adheres	 to	 the	 curatorial	 rigour	 and	 business	 case	 required	 to	 sustain	 and	
responsibly	manage	large	art	collections—particularly	ones	as	unique	as	the	Court	which	have	to	maintain	impartiality—
it	 is	 worth	 noting	 upfront	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 discussion	 of	 human	 dignity	 where	 equal	 access	 to	 opportunity	 and	
participation,	as	well	as	the	shielding	against	visual/vocal	dominance,	is	at	stake.
 
8	United	Nations,	'History	of	the	Document',	<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml>,	accessed	May	
2015.	South	African	History	Archive,	'The	Birth	of	the	Bill	of	Rights',	
<http://www.saha.org.za/billofrights/the_birth_of_the_bill_of_rights.htm>,	accessed	June	2015.
 
9	Nelson	Mandela,	'Nelson	Mandela's	Statement	from	the	Dock	at	the	Opening	of	the	Defence	Case	in	the	Rivonia	Trial',	
<http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=3430>,	accessed	June	2015.	
10	Constitutional	Assembly,	'Interim	Constitution',	<http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/constitution/english-
web/interim/ch3.html>,	accessed	June	2015.	
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…we	shall	build	the	society	in	which	all	South	Africans,	both	black	and	white,	will	be	able	
to	walk	tall,	without	any	fear	in	their	hearts,	assured	of	their	 inalienable	right	to	human	
dignity...11	
 	
The	right	to	human	dignity	became	entrenched	in	a	vision	of	the	nation	reinvented.		
 	
The	first	 line	of	the	final	1996	Constitution	emphasises	human	dignity	as	a	founding	value	of	the	
country:	 “The	 Republic	 of	 South	 Africa	 is	 one,	 sovereign,	 democratic	 state	 founded	 on	 the	
following	values:	(a)	Human	dignity,	the	achievement	of	equality	and	the	advancement	of	human	
rights	 and	 freedoms...”12	 Human	 dignity	 takes	 prime	 position	 in	 this	 trinity	 of	 values.	 The	
Constitution	 also	 mandates	 that	 human	 dignity	 is	 respected,	 protected,	 and	 promoted	 in	 the	
detention	of	prisoners,	 in	the	 interpretation	and	deliverance	of	the	 law,	 in	the	development	and	
support	of	state	institutions,	and	in	the	commitment	sworn	by	Ministers	and	their	Deputies.13	The	
final	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 (chapter	 two	 of	 the	 1996	 Constitution)	 enshrines	 human	 dignity	 further,	
implanting	 it	as	a	value	that	belongs	to	all	people	 in	South	Africa,	regardless	of	citizenship:	“This	
Bill	of	Rights	is	a	cornerstone	of	democracy	in	South	Africa.	It	enshrines	the	rights	of	all	people	in	
our	 country	 and	 affirms	 the	 democratic	 values	 of	 human	 dignity,	 equality	 and	 freedom.”14	 The	
new	 constitution	 broke	 with	 the	 past	 conception	 of	 human	 dignity	 (or	 lack	 thereof)	 under	
apartheid	as	something	which	the	state	could	violate	and	deny.	Instead	it	affirms	human	dignity	as	
what	 former	Constitutional	Court	 Judge,	Kate	O’Regan,	describes	as	“the	touchstone	of	 the	new	
political	order”:		
 	
Apartheid	was	a	denial	of	a	 common	humanity.	Black	people	were	 refused	 respect	and	
dignity	and	thereby	the	dignity	of	all	South	Africans	was	diminished.	The	new	Constitution	
rejects	this	past	and	affirms	the	equal	worth	of	all	South	Africans.	Thus	recognition	and	
protection	 of	 human	 dignity	 is	 the	 touchstone	 of	 the	 new	 political	 order	 and	 is	
fundamental	to	the	new	Constitution.15	
 	
In	 short,	 the	 South	 African	 Constitution	 is	 founded	 on	 the	 value	 of	 human	 dignity,	 but	 it	 also	
promotes	the	governance	of	human	dignity.		
 	
Human	 dignity	 has	 gained	 social	 and	 political	 recognition	 and	 meaning	 through	 its	 journey	 in	
South	 Africa.	 It	 is	 seen	 as	 an	 individual	 right,	 as	 a	 collective	 value	 of	 democracy,	 and	 as	 a	
touchstone	of	political	order.	This	begs	the	question,	what	exactly	is	meant	by	human	dignity	as	a	
right,	 value,	 and	 touchstone?	 The	 concept	 of	 human	 dignity	 encapsulates	 big	 ideas	 “that	 gain	
definition	 through	 specific	 historical	 and	 cultural	 narratives.”16	 It	 is	 a	 concept	 that	 lacks	 one	
meaning	but	evokes	a	plethora	of	 feeling	and	 remains	a	 significant	 idea	 that	 cuts	across	human	
rights	 regimes	 and	 international	 norm	 calibration.	 Mark	 Lagon	 and	 Anthony	 Arend	 trace	 the	
essence	of	human	dignity	from	the	ancients	through	various	schools	of	thought—including	Judeo-
Christian,	 Kantian,	 and	 secular	 universalism—to	 arrive	 at	 a	working	 definition	 of	 human	 dignity	
based	on	agency	and	recognition:		
 	
                                                 
11 Nelson	Mandela,	'Statement	of	Nelson	Mandela	at	His	Inauguration	as	President',	
<http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=3132>,	accessed	June	2015.
 
12 Constitutional	Assembly,	The	Constitution	(1996)	at	9.
 
13 Ibid.
 
14 Ibid.,	at	11. 
 
15 Spencer	Wolff,	'Human	Dignity	and	Freedom	of	Speech	in	the	Post	Apartheid	State',	Macquarie	Law	Journal,	13	(2014),	
99-127	at	105. 
 
16 Ibid.,	at	107.	
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Human	dignity	 is	the	fundamental	agency	of	human	beings	to	apply	their	gifts	to	thrive.	
As	such,	it	requires	social	recognition	of	each	person’s	inherent	value	and	claim	to	equal	
access	 to	 opportunity.	 To	 be	 meaningful,	 human	 dignity	 must	 be	 institutionalized	 in	
practice	and	governance.17	
 	
That	is—as	in	its	trajectory	in	South	Africa—human	dignity	encompasses	three	things:	it	is	right	to	
agency;	 it	 is	a	recognition	of	value;	and,	 it	 is	a	benchmark	of	governance	and	 institutional	order.	
While	 human	 rights	 discourse	 has	 managed	 to	 penetrate	 state	 sovereignty	 in	 order	 to	 foster	
recognition	of	 the	 rights	of	 individuals	 and	provide	 support	 to	 this	 end,	 Lagun	and	Arend	argue	
that	human	dignity	is	in	fact	both	the	premise	behind	human	rights—all	human	beings	are	worth	
something	and	therefore	they	all	have	rights	to	be	possessed	and	protected—and	the	product	of	
human	 rights—“if	 human	 rights	 are	 to	 have	meaning	 beyond	norm	elaboration…	 and	 are	 to	 be	
enjoyed	 in	 practice,	 the	 test	 of	 impact	 is	 whether	 they	 actually	 yield	 the	 agency	 and	 social	
recognition	 that	 constitute	 human	 dignity.”18	 This	 conception	 of	 human	 dignity	 as	 both	 the	
premise	and	practice	of	human	rights	is	doubly	important	in	thinking	about	the	aim	of	this	paper,	
at	the	heart	of	which	is	concerned	whether	the	connections	between	human	dignity	and	art	at	the	
Court	go	beyond	aspirational	promises.		
 	
Human	dignity	has	 come	 to	occupy	an	 important	discursive	 space	 in	 the	 law	of	 South	Africa—a	
space	which	 it	 should	be	noted	may	be	 recognised	 in	principle	 in	 the	constitution,	but	does	not	
automatically	 manifest	 in	 the	 everyday	 reality	 of	 the	 country’s	 occupants.	 As	 Chief	 Justice	
Mogoeng	Mogoeng	points	out:	
 	
It	 doesn’t	 matter	 how	 progressive	 the	 Constitution	 is.	 It	 cannot,	 just	 because	 it	 is	
operative,	touch	me,	in	my	house	to	the	point	where	I	automatically	begin	to	understand	
how	my	white	brothers	and	sisters	think	and	what	I	need	to	do	to	relate	to	them	better.	
Some	practical	steps	must	be	taken	and	we,	as	a	nation,	must	also	be	encouraged	to	take	
them	so	 that…	 [t]he	 ‘ubuntu’	or	 that	spirit	of	 sharing	of	humanity,	of	oneness,	 that	 the	
1993	constitution	provided	for…	[can]	permeate	across	society.19		
 	
The	 concept	 of	 human	 dignity	 shares	 some	 common	 ground	 (and	 some	 tension)	 with	 the	
indigenous	 Southern	 African	 concept	 of	 ubuntu.20	 The	 word	 ubuntu	 translates	 from	 the	 Nguni	
Bantu	 languages	 roughly	 as	 ‘humanness’.	 As	 a	 philosophy,	 ubuntu	 is	 an	 ethic	 of	 communal	
existence,	which	means	 ‘I	 realise	my	humanity	only	when	 I	 realise	yours’,	or	put	another	way	 ‘a	
person	is	a	person	through	other	people’.21	The	idea	of	ubuntu	draws	on	the	understanding	that	
people’s	 individual	 agencies	 are	 inherently	 connected	 and	 realised	 through	 others.	 That	 is,	
personal	 humanity	 is	 affirmed	 and	 afforded	 by	 the	 humanity	 of	 others;	 it	 is	 reciprocal	 and	
mutually	 enjoyed,	 “it	 is	 a	 lived	 system	 of	 norms”.22	 Ubuntu	 draws	 a	 connection	 with	 human	
dignity,	 they	 are	 both	 predicated	 on	 the	 social	 recognition	 of	 human	 value.	 Conversely,	 if	 that	
                                                 
17 Mark	P	Lagon	and	Anthony	Clark	Arend,	Human	Dignity	and	the	Future	of	Global	Institutions	(Georgetown	University	
Press,	2014)	at	16.	
18 Ibid.,	at	322. 
 
19 As	quoted	in	Drew	F	Cohen,	'A	Constitution	at	a	Crossroads:	A	Conversation	with	the	Chief	Justice	of	the	Constitutional	
Court	of	South	Africa',	Northwestern	University	Journal	of	International	Human	Rights,	12/2	(2014)	at	132.	This	idea	that	
the	spirit	of	the	Constitution	does	not	exist	in	everyday	reality	was	a	recurring	theme	in	the	interviews.
 
20 The	intention	in	this	paper	is	not	to	assert	that	ubuntu	and	human	dignity	can	simply	be	assimilated.	They	derive	from	
very	different	 traditions	and	are	at	 times	are	 in	 tension.	Rather,	 the	 intention	here	 is	 to	point	out	 some	connections	
between	the	two,	particularly	as	they	manifest	at	the	Court.		
21 Wolff,	 'Human	Dignity	and	Freedom	of	Speech	 in	the	Post	Apartheid	State',	at	106.	For	an	overview	of	ubuntu	as	a	
moral	theory	see	Thaddeus	Metz,	'Ubuntu	as	a	Moral	Theory	and	Human	Rights	in	South	Africa',	African	Human	Rights	
Law	Journal,	11/2	(2011),	532-59. 
 
22 Tw	Bennett,	'Ubuntu:	An	African	Equity',	PER:	Potchefstroomse	Elektroniese	Regsblad,	14/4	(2011),	29-61.	
University	of	Cambridge	·	Centre	of	Governance	and	Human	Rights	·	Working	Paper	12  
Garnsey,	E.,	‘Framing	Human	Dignity’,	October	2016	  8 
recognition	 is	 denied,	 lost,	 or	 taken	 away	 then	 ubuntu	 and	 human	 dignity	 are	 similarly	
undermined.23	 While	 the	 final	 1996	 Constitution	 made	 no	 express	 mention	 of	 ubuntu	 (even	
though	 the	preceding	 interim	Constitution	did),	 the	Constitutional	Court	 “regularly	emphasise[s]	
the	 overlap	 between	 ubuntu,	 rights	 articulated	 in	 the	 Constitution,	 and	 emerging	 international	
legal	norms.”24	During	interviews	with	judges,	law	clerks	and	staff	at	the	Court,	ubuntu	was	often	
used	 interchangeably	 with	 human	 dignity—a	 slippage	 indicative	 of	 how	 ubuntu,	 like	 human	
dignity,	is	embedded	in	the	human	rights	governance	enacted	by	the	Court.		
 	
3. A	site	of	human	dignity	
 	
South	 Africa’s	 Constitution	 is	 characterised	 by	 a	 spirit	 of	 transition	 and	 transformation.25	 The	
Constitutional	Court	has	been	foundational	to	the	country’s	ongoing	transition	in	three	ways.	First,	
the	 Court	 has	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 symbolic	 transition	 of	 a	 nation	moving	 to	 constitutional	
democracy.	 Established	at	 the	point	of	 transition	 in	1994,	 the	Court	became	a	 symbol	of	 a	new	
justice	system,	one	intended	to	safeguard	human	rights.	In	2013,	the	symbolism	of	the	Court	was	
elevated	 when	 it	 became	 the	 highest	 court	 of	 appeal	 in	 South	 Africa,	 having	 previously	 been	
considered	the	highest	court	for	matters	relating	only	to	the	constitution.26		
 	
Second,	the	Court’s	rulings	have	been	central	to	the	institutional	transformation	of	human	rights	
in	 South	 Africa.	 Between	 1995	 and	 2013	 the	 Court	 heard	 over	 160	 cases	 in	 which	 “the	
constitutionality	of	legislation	was	directly	challenged	as	human	rights	violations…	[and]	declared	
legislation	unconstitutional	in	100	instances.”27	In	its	first	case	in	1995,	the	Court	ruled	the	death	
penalty	 to	 be	 unconstitutional.28	 In	 2000	 the	 Court	 ruled	 that	 the	 State	must	 provide	 access	 to	
housing,	 stating	 that	 “[h]uman	dignity,	 freedom	and	equality	 are	denied	 to	 those	without	 food,	
clothing	or	shelter”—a	declaration	which	underscores	the	importance	of	human	dignity	as	a	right	
in	the	Court’s	decisions.29	In	2002,	when	deliberating	on	the	right	to	health	care—specifically	the	
right	to	access	HIV/Aids	treatment—the	Court	stated	that	“[n]o	one	should	be	condemned	to	a	life	
below	 the	 basic	 level	 of	 dignified	 human	 existence.”30	 In	 2005,	 the	 Court	 ruled	 in	 favour	 of	
marriage	equality,	finding	the	narrow	definition	of	marriage	in	common	law	to	violate	the	rights	of	
same-sex	 couples.31	 These	 rulings	 epitomise	 the	dignity	 jurisprudence	emerging	 from	 the	Court;	
enabling	 human	 dignity	 underscores	 the	 constitutional	 project,	 at	 least	 in	 its	 initial	 phase.32	
                                                 
23 “In	failing	to	respect	the	humanity	of	others	we	actually	undermine	humanity	in	ourselves”	in	Michael	Rosen,	Dignity:	
Its	History	and	Meaning	(Harvard	University	Press,	2012)	at	157.
 
24 Chuma	 Himonga,	 Max	 Taylor,	 and	 Anne	 Pope,	 'Reflections	 on	 Judicial	 Views	 of	 Ubuntu',	 PER:	 Potchefstroomse	
Elektroniese	Regsblad,	16/5	(2013),	01-61	at	7.	The	interim	constitution	was	the	first	official	document	to	use	the	term	
ubuntu,	see	Tw	Bennett,	'Ubuntu:	An	African	Equity',	ibid.14/4	(2011),	29-61.	See	also	Drucilla	Cornell,	Ubuntu	and	the	
Law:	African	Ideals	and	Postapartheid	Jurisprudence	(Fordham	University	Press,	2012).
 
25 Pius	Langa,	'The	Investigating	Directorate:	Serious	Economic	Offences	and	Others	Versus	Hyundai	Motor	Distributors	
(Pty)	Ltd	and	Others',	Case	No.	CCT	1/00	(Constitutional	Court	of	South	Africa,	2000),	1-43	at	18. 
 
26 Government	Gazette,	<http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2013-010.pdf>,	accessed	February	2015.
 
27 Wessel	Le	Roux,	 'Descriptive	Overview	of	the	South	African	Constitution	and	Constitutional	Court',	 in	Oscar	Vilhena,	
Upendra	Baxi,	and	Frans	Viljoen	(eds.),	Transformative	Constitutionalism:	Comparing	the	Apex	Courts	of	Brazil,	India	and	
South	Africa	(Pretoria	University	Law	Press,	2013),	135-75	at	171.
 
28 Arthur	 Chaskalson,	 'The	 State	 Versus	 T	Makwanyane	 and	M	Mchunu',	 Case	 No.	 CCT/3/94	 (Constitutional	 Court	 of	
South	Africa,	1995).		
29 Zac	Yacoob,	 'Government	of	the	Republic	of	South	Africa	and	Others	V	 Irene	Grootboom	and	Others',	Case	No.	CCT	
11/00	(Constitutional	Court	of	South	Africa,	2000)	at	19. 
 
30 The	 Court,	 'Minister	 of	 Health	 and	 Others	 Versus	 Treatment	 Action	 Campaign	 and	 Other',	 Case	 No.	 CCT	 8/02	
(Constitutional	Court	of	South	Africa,	2002)	at	22.	
31 The	Court,	'Media	Summary',	<http://41.208.61.234/uhtbin/cgisirsi/20150611172358/SIRSI/0/520/S-CCT60-04>,	
accessed	June	2015.
 
32 For	an	overview	of	 the	dignity	 jurisprudence	emerging	 from	the	Court	 see	Drucilla	Cornell,	 Stu	Woolman,	and	Sam	
Fuller	(eds.),	The	Dignity	Jurisprudence	of	the	Constitutional	Court	of	South	Africa:	Cases	and	Materials,	(1	&	2:	Fordham	
University	Press,	2013).
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Interestingly,	 the	Court	also	chooses	 to	visually	define	 itself	by	 these	 rulings	 through	a	billboard	
which	 hangs	 prominently	 in	 its	 art	 gallery.	 This	 visual	 announcement	 of	 the	 Court’s	 rulings	
reinforces	an	appearance	of	jurisprudence	grounded	in	dignity.		
 	
Third,	 the	 Court	 has	 physically	 transformed	 infamous	 prison	 sites.	 As	 South	 Africa’s	 first	 major	
post-apartheid	government	building,	 the	Court	was	built	on	 the	site	of	 several	 former	notorious	
prisons—Number	Four,	the	Women’s	Gaol,	and	the	Old	Fort—where	“[v]irtually	every	 important	
political	leader	in	South	African	history	from	Mahatma	Gandhi	to	Nelson	Mandela	as	well	as	scores	
of	 ordinary	 South	 Africans	 caught	 in	 the	 web	 of	 colonial	 and	 apartheid	 repression”	 were	 once	
imprisoned—“The	old	stonewalls	tell	a	century’s	worth	of	stories	of	an	iniquitous	political	system,	
a	brutal	penal	institution,	and	the	resilience	of	generations	of	prisoners.”33	The	Court	now	stands	
on	 the	 site	 that	 once	 was	 the	 awaiting	 trial	 block	 of	 Number	 Four	 prison—the	 former	 prison	
buildings	 and	 cells	 still	 surround	 it,	 and	 elements	 of	 the	 former	 buildings	 form	 part	 of	 it.	 For	
instance,	 the	 stairwell	 of	 the	 trial	 block	 confronts	 visitors	 as	 they	 enter	 the	 Court	 building.	 Still	
showing	 the	 original	 graffiti,	 it	 forms	 part	 of	 the	 wall	 of	 the	 main	 Court	 chamber.	 The	 Court	
complex	also	 reused	around	150,000	bricks	 from	the	 former	prison	buildings.	This	 is	particularly	
evident	in	the	main	Court	chamber	where	the	exposed	recycled	bricks	serve	as	a	visual	reminder—
and	 metaphor	 that	 is	 regularly	 offered	 by	 people	 working	 at	 the	 Court—that	 South	 Africa’s	
constitutional	freedom	is	built	with	the	bricks	that	once	imprisoned	the	nation.		
 	
The	building	of	the	Court	has	physically	transformed	the	site	of	human	dignity—what	was	once	a	
place	that	violated	human	rights	is	now	a	place	that	protects	them:	
 	
...symbolic	of	the	constitutional	project	of	creating	a	bridge	between	a	terrible	past	and	a	
brighter	future.	It	is	not	a	bridge	that	can	simply	be	crossed	once,	leaving	the	past	behind.	
It	is	a	bridge	that	must	be	crossed	again	and	again	in	the	constant	search	for	justice	in	our	
young	 democracy.	 The	 Prison	 in	 the	 Court	 and	 the	 Court	 in	 the	 Prison	 is	 a	 constant	
reminder	of	this	fact.34	
 	
The	bricks	in	the	new	building	force	together	what	was—the	prison—and	what	is—the	Court—in	
order	 to	 capture	 what	 can	 be—the	 realisation	 of	 human	 dignity	 in	 this	 space.35	 This	 spatial	
transformation	 resonates	 with	 the	 Court	 being	 a	 utopia	 ‘somewhere’;	 a	 place	 in	 which	 human	
dignity	becomes	realised	by	the	intentional	transformation	of	the	physical	space	from	a	prison	site	
lacking	in	human	dignity,	to	a	site	of	justice	realising—ruling	on—and	containing	human	dignity.	It	
is	not	a	conquering	of	space,	but	a	meeting	of	two	histories.36		
 	
There	is	an	element	of	over	determination	to	this	site	of	human	dignity.	The	transformation	of	the	
space—and	the	institution	of	the	Court—was	a	deliberate	move	away	from	the	past,	at	the	same	
time	 it	 remains	 a	 considered	 contrast	 against	 that	 past.37	 It	 is	 a	 utopia	 of	 human	 dignity	
                                                 
33 Lauren	 Segal,	 Number	 Four:	 The	 Making	 of	 Constitution	 Hill	 (Penguin	 Global,	 2006)	 at	 i.	 Also	 see	 Sarah	 Longair,	
'Unlocking	 the	Doors	 of	Number	 Four	 Prison'	 in	 Lizelle	 Bisschoff	 and	 Stefanie	 Van	De	 Peer	 (eds.),	 Art	 and	 Trauma	 in	
Africa:	Representations	of	Reconciliation	in	Music,	Visual	Arts,	Literature	and	Film	(IB	Tauris,	2013)	at	114.
 
34 Melissa	Perry,	'The	Role	of	the	Courts	under	the	South	African	Constitution:	An	Australian	Comparison',	
<http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/publications/judges-speeches/justice-perry/perry-j-20140221>,	accessed	January	2015.
 
35 Cooper	 argues	 that	 utopias	 are	 about	 bringing	 together	 what	 is	 and	 what	 could	 be,	 in	 Davina	 Cooper,	 Everyday	
Utopias:	The	Conceptual	Life	of	Promising	Spaces	(Duke	University	Press,	2013).	To	this	I	add,	a	third	perspective,	‘what	
was’.	Utopias	are	not	only	about	a	contrast	to	the	present,	but	they	can	also	be	a	desire	to	move	away	from	the	past. 
 
36 Massey	 raises	 the	 idea	 that	 space	 can	 be	 conceived	 of	 as	 a	 meeting	 of	 histories	 rather	 than	 as	 a	 surface	 to	 be	
conquered,	in	Doreen	Massey,	For	Space	(Sage,	2005)	at	4.
 
37 The	Court	building	 is	 a	 contrast	 to	 the	past	by	being	deeply	embedded	 in	memorialising	 that	past.	Wessel	 le	Roux	
describes	the	Constitutional	Court	as	an	apartheid	memorial,	in	Wessel	Le	Roux,	'War	Memorials,	the	Architecture	of	the	
Constitutional	Court	Building	and	Countermonumental	Constitutionalism',	in	Karin	Van	Marle	and	Wessel	Le	Roux	(eds.),	
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underscored	 by	 an	 explicit	 intention	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 that	 dignity	 is	 enacted	 through	 the	
specific	transformation	of	architecture—prisons	into	a	court.	The	spatial	transformation	of	human	
dignity	 is	 realised	 through	 the	 physical	 building	 of	 the	 Court,	 while	 the	 jurisprudential	
transformation	 of	 human	dignity	 remains	 ongoing	 through	 the	 practices	 and	 judgements	 of	 the	
Court.	 In	 this	way,	 the	 symbolic,	 institutional,	 and	physical	 transformations	by	 the	Court,	 in	 the	
Court,	and	of	the	Court,	position	it	as	a	site	constituting	human	dignity;	a	utopia	realised	through	
an	extant	space.38		
 	
4. The	visual	jurisprudence	of	human	dignity		
 	
In	such	close	proximity	to	the	provision	of	justice	enacted	by	the	Court,	the	art	collection	inhabits	
a	unique	position	in	which	the	assumptions	of	human	dignity	and	what	it	means	to	uphold	human	
rights	 can	 be	 probed.	 Artworks—and	 the	 art	 collection	 as	 a	 whole—are	 complex	 sights	 of	
gathering	 which	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 past,	 the	 present,	 and	 the	 future;	 they	
embody	an	inherent	subjectivity	which	is	part	of	their	dynamic	complexity	and	potential.39	Unlike	
the	physical	site	of	the	Court	which	positions	human	dignity	as	an	intentional	utopia	somewhere—
a	place—the	art	collection	captures	discursive	sights	of	human	dignity	in	the	process	of	becoming;	
forever	 an	 unfolding	 journey	 to	 a	 utopia	 ‘out	 there’,	 a	 direction.	 The	 art	 collection	 does	 not	
represent	 a	 utopia,	 or	 imagine	 a	 utopia,	 or	 dream	 a	 utopia—an	 alternative—as	 is	 so	 often	
theorised	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 art.	 Rather,	 the	 art	 collection	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 visual	 jurisprudence	 which	
frames	and	 re-frames	 the	 conceptions	of	human	dignity	emanating	 from	 the	Court;	 in	doing	 so,	
the	 collection	 frames	 human	 dignity	 as	 a	 utopia	 still	 to	 be	 achieved,	 not	 an	 ideal	 image	 to	 be	
followed.		
 	
The	 idea	of	visual	 jurisprudence	 is	a	relatively	recent	one,	most	often	conceived	as	the	“array	of	
visual	evidence	and	visual	argument”	used	inside	the	courtroom.40	Richard	Sherwin	uses	the	term	
to	examine	 the	proliferation	of	 visual	media—particularly	 screen	 imagery—in	 the	 law,	 exploring	
what	it	means	for	visuals	to	be	seen	as	credible	and	calling	for	visual	literacy	training	for	lawyers,	
judges	and	jurors.41	Other	areas	of	law	examine	the	visual,	but	do	not	go	as	far	as	to	use	the	term	
visual	jurisprudence.42	What	these	discussions	about	the	visual	in	law	have	in	common	is	the	idea	
that	 visuality	has	 the	potential	 to	engender	belief,	 particularly	when	applied	 to,	 and	probed	by,	
systems	of	justice.	This	is	perhaps	more	obvious	in	particular	instances,	such	as	when	visuals—for	
example	CCTV	footage—are	presented	as	evidence	during	a	case.		
 	
The	conception	of	visual	jurisprudence	I	am	proposing	here	is	slightly	different	because	it	takes	as	
its	 starting	 point	 the	 inherently	 subjective	 world	 of	 visual	 art.	 More	 than	 this,	 it	 is	 a	 specific	
conception	 of	 art	 as	 visual	 jurisprudence	 in	 the	 context	 of	 South	 Africa’s	 Constitutional	 Court	
where	the	presence	of	the	art	collection	in	the	Court,	and	the	integration	of	art	into	the	fabric	of	
                                                                                                                                     
Law,	Memory,	and	the	Legacy	of	Apartheid:	Ten	Years	after	Azapo	V.	President	of	South	Africa	(PULP,	2007),	65-92.	Also	
see	this	chapter	for	an	in-depth	description	and	consideration	of	the	architecture	of	the	Court. 
 
38 Utopias	 are	 characterised	 by	 transformation,	 see	 Lyman	 Tower	 Sargent,	 Utopianism:	 A	 Very	 Short	 Introduction	
(Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2010).	 And	 Ruth	 Levitas,	 'Introduction:	 The	 Elusive	 Idea	 of	 Utopia',	 History	 of	 the	 Human	
sciences,	16/1	(2003),	1-10.
 
39 The	idea	that	artworks	are	complex	sights	of	gathering	which	have	the	potential	to	intervene	in	the	past,	the	present,	
and	 the	 future	emerges	 from	Walter	Benjamin’s	 idea	of	 the	dialectical	 image	as	a	 temporal	 constellation,	 see	Walter	
Benjamin,	The	Arcades	Project	(Harvard	University	Press,	1999)	at	462.		
40 Richard	K.	Sherwin,	'Visual	Jurisprudence',	New	York	Law	School	Law	Review,	57/11	(2012),	11-39	at	12.	
41 Ibid,	Richard	K	Sherwin,	Visualizing	Law	in	the	Age	of	the	Digital	Baroque:	Arabesques	and	Entanglements	(Routledge,	
2011).
 
42 For	 example	 see	 Neal	 Feigenson,	 'The	 Visual	 in	 Law:	 Some	 Problems	 for	 Legal	 Theory',	 Law,	 Culture	 and	 the	
Humanities,	10/1	(2014),	13-23.	And	Desmond	Manderson,	 'The	Law	of	the	 Image	and	the	 Image	of	the	Law:	Colonial	
Representations	of	the	Rule	of	Law',	New	York	Law	School	Law	Review,	57	(2012	2012),	153-68.
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the	 building,	 is	 a	 unique	 instance	 where	 art	 is	 closely	 connected	 to,	 and	 blended	 with,	 the	
deliverance	of	 law	and	the	site	of	human	dignity.	 If	 jurisprudence	 is	 the	 theory	or	philosophy	of	
law,	then	visual	jurisprudence—as	I	see	it—is	the	philosophy	of	the	visual	in	law,	which	extends	to	
visuals	 both	 inside	 and	 outside	 the	 courtroom.	m.	 Put	 differently,	 visual	 jurisprudence	 revolves	
around	how	visuality	effects	and	affects	the	thinking	of	law	not	only	by	engendering	belief	(inside	
the	courtroom)	but	also	by	engaging	the	moral	imagination	(outside	the	courtroom).43	Art	as	visual	
jurisprudence	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 is	 central	 in	 forming	 the	 bodies	 of	
aesthetic	knowledge	that	shape	how	law—specifically	the	enactment	of	this	law	in	shaping	human	
dignity—is	 understood,	 and	 even	 more	 so	 in	 forming	 the	 bodies	 of	 knowledge	 that	 shape	 the	
appearance	of	human	dignity	in	South	Africa.	By	looking	at	the	artworks	and	the	art	collection	as	a	
kind	 of	 visual	 jurisprudence	 (different	 the	 existing	 understanding	 of	 visual	 evidence	 used	 in	 the	
administration	of	the	law)	it	is	possible	to	excavate	how	ideas	of	human	dignity	are	framed	at	the	
Court.		
 	
5. Sights	of	human	dignity		
 	
Outside	 the	main	entrance	 to	 the	Constitutional	Court	 sits	 a	 large	bronze	 sculpture	made	up	of	
four	 figures.	 The	 largest	 of	 the	 figures	 rests	 on	 all	 fours	 in	 an	 animal	 like	 position,	 bit	 between	
teeth,	the	man	is	strapped	to	a	cart,	pulling	the	other	figures	along.	On	the	cart	crouches	another	
figure,	on	which	two	other	figures—a	woman	indicated	by	her	bare	chest	and	a	man	implied	by	his	
bowler	 hat—sit.	 At	 first	 encounter	 this	 sculpture—entitled	 History	 by	 Dumile	 Feni	 (fig.	 2)—
resonates	“with	the	history	of	servitude	that	marked	the	dehumanizing	institution	of	apartheid.”44	
The	sculpture	appears	as	a	visual	metaphor	for	the	subjugated	majority	whose	labor	supports	the	
dominant	 minority;	 the	 man	 is	 yoked	 to	 the	 cart,	 dragging	 its	 occupants.	 History	 provokes	
questions	about	the	relationships	between	the	figures	and	the	relationship	of	the	sculpture	to	the	
Court—why	 would	 the	 Court	 have	 a	 sculpture	 that	 references	 oppression	 outside	 its	 main	
entrance?		
 	
All	 the	 figures	 share	 similar	 abstracted	 and	 exaggerated	 features.	 This	 complicates	 the	 initial	
reading	of	the	artwork	as	a	slave-master	dynamic,	especially	in	the	context	of	South	Africa	where	
oppression	has	historically	been	divided	along	‘racial’	lines.	History—as	it	looms	large	in	its	current	
state	outside	 the	Court—was	cast	 from	a	small	marquette	Feni	made	 in	1987,	shortly	before	he	
died	 in	1991.	According	to	Sachs,	the	artist	 intended	the	sculpture	to	 illustrate	“how	throughout	
history	some	people	had	given	their	bodies	and	souls	to	pull	others	along.”45	On	tours	the	curator	
extends	 this	 explanation	 to	 provide	 an	 interpretation	 of	 the	 artwork	 as	 a	 characterisation	 of	
universal	human	relationships,	a	sentiment	echoed	by	the	Court:		
 	
…the	 man	 drawing	 the	 cart	 is	 the	 only	 figure	 who	 is	 large	 and	 strong	 enough	 to	
accomplish	 this	 task...	 the	 four	 figures	 carry	 each	 other	 in	 a	 way	 that	 reflects	 the	
dependence,	 the	 interconnectedness,	 and	 the	 tension	 that	 have	 always	 characterized	
human	relationships.46		
 	
                                                 
43 John	 Lederach	 uses	 the	 term	 ‘moral	 imagination’	 to	 refer	 to	 “the	 capacity	 to	 imagine	 something	 rooted	 in	 the	
challenges	of	the	real	world”	in	John	Paul	Lederach,	The	Moral	Imagination:	The	Art	and	Soul	of	Building	Peace	(Oxon:	
Oxford	University	Press,	2004).		
44 Edwin	Cameron	and	Albie	 Sachs,	 'Celebrating	Transition:	Apartheid	 to	Democracy',	World	Policy	Blog	 (World	Policy	
Institute,	2014).
 
45 Law-Viljoen	and	Law-Viljoen,	Art	and	Justice	at	193.
 
46 Cameron	and	Sachs,	'Celebrating	Transition:	Apartheid	to	Democracy'.	
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At	 first	 look	 History	 resembles	 the	 history	 of	 oppression	 in	 South	 Africa;	 at	 second	 look	 the	
sculpture	can	be	interpreted	as	how	throughout	history	humans	have	carried	one	another.	A	third	
look	 at	History	 reveals	 how	 it	 communicates	multiple	 ideas	 about	 human	 relationships.	 Human	
participation	is	a	central	concern	of	the	artwork,	but	not	one	that	can	necessarily	be	pinned	down.	
History	 captures	 a	 certain	 complexity	 of	 human	 relationships—each	 figure	 within	 the	 artwork	
plays	a	role	through	which	their	value	is	visually	recognised.	However,	this	value	is	complicated	by	
the	implications	of	power	that	underscore	the	image	of	subjugation	and	labor.	The	recognition	of	
human	 value	 remains	 circumscribed	 by	 the	 inherent	 intricacies	 and	 dynamics	 of	 human	
relationships;	individual	and	collective	human	agencies	are	in	tension.		
 	
Although	conceptually	ambiguous,	the	sculpture	is	physically	accessible.	Being	located	outside	the	
main	entrance	to	the	Court,	means	History	inhabits	a	space	that	acts	as	a	pedestrian	thoroughfare	
between	the	inner	city	suburbs	of	Braamfontein	and	Hillbrow.	History	 is	a	monumental	reminder	
to	 the	 ongoing	 journey	 to	 achieve	 human	 dignity.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 that	 it	 provokes	 questions	
about	 the	 value	 of	 human	 dignity,	 it	 challenges	 the	 right	 to	 human	 dignity.	 While	 the	
interpretation	of	the	artwork	is	not	as	straightforwardly	optimistic	as	the	official	reading	provided	
by	the	Court	may	suggest,	the	sculpture	does	probe	what	it	means	for	humans	to	coexist.47	History	
confronts	 the	 viewer	 to	 think	 more	 deeply	 about	 the	 balances	 of	 power	 and	 structures	 of	
dominance	that	have	underscored,	and	continue	to	underscore,	human	relationships—especially	
in	South	Africa	where	 the	dominance	of	 the	 ‘haves’	over	 the	 ‘have	nots’	 remains	poignant.	This	
challenge	speaks	to	the	very	heart	of	the	ability	of	the	Court	to	uphold	human	dignity	in	the	face	
of	ongoing	structural	injustices	that	inhibit	the	equalising	right	to	human	dignity	stipulated	by	the	
Constitution.		
 	
Inside	the	main	art	gallery	section	of	the	Court	building,	hangs	Judith	Mason’s	The	Man	Who	Sang	
and	 the	 Woman	Who	 Kept	 Silent	 1998	 (fig.	 3)—also	 known	 as	 The	 Blue	 Dress.	 The	 three-part	
installation	 commemorates	 the	 deaths	 of	 Phila	 Ndwandwe	 and	 Harold	 Sefola	 who	 were	 killed	
during	 the	 struggle	against	 apartheid.	 Suspended	 from	 the	double-height	 ceiling	 is	 a	blue	dress,	
sewn	from	segments	of	plastic	bags,	on	which	Mason	has	written:		
 	
Sister,	a	plastic	bag	may	not	be	 the	whole	armour	of	God,	but	you	were	wrestling	with	
flesh	 and	 blood,	 and	 against	 powers,	 against	 the	 rulers	 of	 darkness,	 against	 spiritual	
wickedness	 in	 sordid	 places.	 Your	 weapons	 were	 your	 silence	 and	 a	 piece	 of	 rubbish.	
Finding	 that	 bag	 and	 wearing	 it	 until	 you	 were	 disinterred	 is	 such	 a	 frugal,	
commonsensical,	house-wifely	 thing	 to	do,	an	ordinary	act...	At	 some	 level	you	shamed	
your	captors,	and	 they	did	not	compound	 their	abuse	of	you	by	stripping	you	a	 second	
time.	 Yet	 they	 killed	 you.	 We	 only	 know	 your	 story	 because	 a	 sniggering	 man	
remembered	how	brave	you	were.	Memorials	to	your	courage	are	everywhere;	they	blow	
about	in	the	streets	and	drift	on	the	tide	and	cling	to	thorn-bushes.	This	dress	is		
 made	from	some	of	them.	Hambe	kahle.	Umkhonto.	
 	
Mason	wrote	this	epitaph	to	Ndwandwe	after	hearing	the	testimony	of	her	killer	at	the	Truth	and	
Reconciliation	 Commission.	 She	 recalls	 weeping	 when	 hearing	 how	 Ndwandwe	 was	 shot	 by	
security	 police	 after	 being	 kept	 naked	 for	 weeks	 “in	 an	 attempt	 to	 make	 her	 inform	 on	 her	
                                                 
47 While	 the	Court	 is	 freely	accessible,	 the	curator	or	a	 tour	guide	often	 leads	viewers	 through	 the	art	 collection.	The	
curatorial	 interpretation	 of	 artworks	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 setting-up	 viewers	 for	 an	 experience	 at	 the	 Court.	
However,	 the	subjective	nature	of	artworks	means	 that	 these	official	 readings	can	be	 ‘flipped’.	The	utopian	charge	 in	
fact	 lies	 in	 the	 critique	 of	 artworks;	 they	 are	 not	 straightforward	 visions	 of	 human	 dignity,	 they	 are	 interventions	 in	
conceptions	of	what	human	dignity	means	and	entails. 
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comrades”.48	Mason	describes	that	Ndwandwe	“preserved	her	dignity	by	making	panties	out	of	a	
blue	plastic	bag.	This	garment	was	found	wrapped	around	her	pelvis	when	she	was	exhumed.”49		
 	
In	The	Blue	Dress,	the	blue	plastic	bag	becomes	a	sign	of	dignity;	a	sign	emphasising	the	value	of	
individual	human	dignity	in	the	face	of	collective	indignity.	This	same	idea	is	also	reflected	in	the	
painting	 about	 Sefola,	 who	 before	 being	 electrocuted	 by	 the	 security	 police	 sang	Nkosi	 Sikelel’	
iAfrika	(God	Bless	Africa);	now	South	Africa’s	national	anthem.	Sefola’s	act	of	resistance—singing	
in	the	face	death—shares	similar	overtones	to	Ndwandwe’s	resistance	in	remaining	silent.	Sefola	
upheld	his	human	dignity	through	voice;	Ndwandwe	upheld	hers	through	silence.	Mason	imparts	
these	 stories	 through	 a	 visual	 memorial	 in	 which	 she	 emphasises	 the	 role	 of	 individual	 people	
against	the	collective	regime	of	apartheid—symbolised	in	part	in	the	paintings	where	the	candles	
shine	brightly	against	the	hyenas	lurking	in	the	background.	The	value	of	individual	human	dignity	
is	preserved	through	these	acts	of	resistance	and	in	the	commemoration	of	these	acts.		
 	
Ndwandwe’s	and	Sefola’s	stories	are	discursive	memories	for	the	people	who	work	at	the	Court.	
Several	 judges	 spoke	about	The	Blue	Dress	 epitomising	human	dignity	and	 the	 type	of	 injustices	
the	 Court	 is	 trying	 to	 protect	 against;	 an	 artwork	 living	 in	 the	 ‘judicial	 consciousness’	 of	 the	
Court.50	 This	 idea	 is	 particularly	 pertinent	 in	 considering	 The	 Blue	 Dress	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 visual	
jurisprudence.	While	the	value	of	human	dignity	is	preserved	in	the	artwork,	The	Blue	Dress	 lives	
on	 in	 judicial	 consciousness	 as	 something	which	must	 be	 prevented—Ndwandwe’s	 and	 Sefola’s	
murders	should	never	be	repeated—it	also	remains	a	vision	of	human	dignity—resistance	against	
tyranny—which	should	be	strived	towards.	The	artwork	inhabits	a	tension	of	human	dignity	being	
achieved	 and	 needing	 to	 be	 achieved	 again;	 inspiring	 the	 moral	 imagination	 toward	 human	
dignity,	in	a	process	that	warns	against	its	lack	and	encourages	its	presence.		
 	
At	 the	 entrance	 to	 the	Number	 four	museum—less	 than	 50	metres	 from	 the	 Court—is	 a	 quote	
from	Mandela,	writ	large,	which	says:		
 	
It	 is	 said	 that	 no	 one	 truly	 knows	 a	 nation	 until	 one	 has	 been	 inside	 its	 jails.	 A	 nation	
should	not	be	judged	by	how	it	treats	its	highest	citizens,	but	its	lowest	ones	—	and	South	
Africa	treated	its	African	citizens	like	animals.	
 	
Inside	the	museum,	26	isolation	cells	still	exist	in	their	original	state;	their	stiflingly	small	walls	bear	
the	marks	and	graffiti	of	former	inmates.	These	cells	are	physical	reminders	of	the	brutality	of	the	
apartheid	 regime.	 Standing	 outside	 the	 cells,	 the	 Court’s	 library	 tower	 and	 logo	 are	 visually	
prominent;	looming	large,	a	tree	of	justice	casting	its	shadow	on	the	prison.	The	site	of	the	Court	is	
a	 constant	 reminder	of	 the	violations	of	human	 rights	 it	now	protects;	 a	 site	of	utopia	 in	which	
what	was—the	apartheid	past—collides	with	what	is—constitutional	democracy—to	imagine	what	
could	be—a	future	shaped	by	human	dignity.	While	this	collision	intentionally	happens	on	site,	it	
remains	unsettling	in	the	sights	of	the	art	collection.			
 	
The	isolation	cells	have	a	prominent	presence	inside	the	Court.	Hanging	in	the	corridor	the	judges	
and	their	clerks	use	to	enter	the	court	chamber,	 is	David	Goldblatt’s	photographic	work,	entitled	
Twenty-six	 punishment	 cells	 and	 lavatory.	 Number	 Four,	 Hillbrow,	 Johannesburg.	 31	 December	
1999	 (fig.	4).	 In	this	work	a	photograph	of	each	isolation	cell	 is	sandwiched	together,	so	that	the	
work	 forms	one	 long,	horizontal	 image,	over	 three	metres	 in	 length—the	artwork	 is	 longer	 than	
                                                 
48 Judith	Mason	in	Albie	Sachs,	The	Strange	Alchemy	of	Life	and	Law	(Oxford	University	Press,	2009)	at	vii.	 ‘Comrades’	
refers	to	Umkhonto	we	Sizwe	(Spear	of	the	Nation)	of	which	Ndwandwe	was	a	member. 
 
49 Mason	in	ibid.
 
50 Four	out	of	the	six	judges	interviewed	referred	to	The	Blue	Dress.	‘Judicial	consciousness’	was	a	recurring	phrase	used	
by	the	judges	during	interviews. 
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the	longest	wall	of	an	individual	isolation	cell.	Every	time	a	person	walks	down	this	corridor	they	
are	 confronted	 with	 the	 grid-like	 repetition	 of	 these	 bleak	 cells.	 This	 is	 even	 more	 poignant	
considering	 that	 several	 of	 the	 judges	who	 currently	 serve	 or	 have	 served	 on	 the	 bench	 of	 the	
Constitutional	Court	have	at	one	time	been	incarcerated	in	isolation	cells.51		
 	
The	scale	of	past	abuse	under	the	apartheid	regime	is	emphasised	by	the	repetitive	images	of	the	
cells	 in	Goldblatt’s	work,	which	 functions	 as	 both	 a	 reminder	 of	 this	 past	 and	 a	warning	 not	 to	
repeat	 it.	 As	 a	 touchstone	 of	 South	 Africa’s	 new	 constitutional	 democracy	 human	 dignity	 is	
emphasised	in	Goldblatt’s	work	by	its	antithesis,	what	it	is	not.	Human	dignity	is	not	the	inhuman	
treatment	 of	 a	 nation’s	 ‘lowest	 citizens’,	 and	 in	 practice	 it	 cannot	 be	 a	 touchstone	 if	 it	 is	 not	
institutionalised	 in	 governance.	 By	 documenting	 the	 desolate	 inhumanity	 of	 the	 isolation	 cells,	
Goldblatt’s	photographs	implicitly	urge	the	viewer	not	to	loose	sight	of	the	touchstone	of	human	
dignity.	That	this	image	is	located	at	the	private	judicial	entrance	to	the	Court	chamber	serves	as	a	
well-crafted	 reminder	 of	 this	 touchstone	 (as	 negative	 liberty)	 for	 the	 people	who	 protect	 it	 the	
most.	The	art	collection	shifts	from	judicial	consciousness	to	judicial	confrontation.		
 	
Each	of	artworks	discussed,	offer	a	different	perspective	on	the	idea	of	human	dignity	and	probe	
the	notion	of	what	human	dignity	as	the	promise	of	human	rights	means	and	entails	in	the	context	
of	the	Constitutional	Court.	The	artworks	and	the	art	collection—like	the	Constitution	 itself—are	
signs	that	the	promise	of	human	dignity	is	underway	in	South	Africa,	but	these	signs	alone	do	not	
represent	 the	 fulfillment	 of	 this	 right,	 value,	 and	 touchstone.	 Rather,	 the	 artworks	 point	 to	 the	
past	so	that	the	future	may	be	shaped	along	more	dignified	lines.	While	the	artworks	are	curated	
in	a	such	a	way	as	to	elicit	reflections	on	human	dignity—the	sculpture	outside	the	entrance,	the	
ghostly	dress	hanging	 in	 the	gallery,	 the	 images	of	cells	 confronting	 the	 judges—their	 subjective	
and	complex	nature	make	 it	more	difficult	 for	a	human	dignity	narrative	to	be	over	determined.	
This	 is	 in	contrast	 to	the	site	of	 the	Court,	where	the	space	 is	actively	transformed	to	constitute	
human	 dignity.	 The	 sights	 of	 human	 dignity	 in	 the	 art	 collection	 position	 it	 as	 ongoing	 and	
relational;	a	utopia	‘out	there’	in	the	process	of	being	grasped.		
 	
6. Conclusion	
 	
The	 paper	 began	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 conception	 of	 human	 dignity	 offered	 in	 South	 Africa’s	
Constitution,	briefly	outlining	how	 it	 is	 conceived	 in	 three	ways:	as	a	 right;	as	a	value;	and,	as	a	
touchstone	of	political	order.	Section	two	introduced	the	Constitutional	Court	as	a	site	of	human	
dignity,	 which	 has	 undergone	 symbolic,	 institutional,	 as	well	 as	 physical	 transformations.	 These	
transformations	position	the	Court	as	a	place	of	 intentional	human	dignity;	a	utopia	somewhere,	
realised	by	the	containment	and	enactment	of	human	dignity.	In	section	three	I	proposed	the	art	
collection	as	a	kind	of	visual	jurisprudence	in	order	to	understand	how	the	idea	of	human	dignity	is	
framed	by	the	artworks	and	intervene	in	the	site	of	the	Court.	The	artworks	discussed	in	section	
four	 respond	 to	 the	 three	 notions	 of	 human	 dignity	 as	 a	 right,	 a	 value,	 and	 a	 cornerstone	 of	
political	order	expressed	in	South	African	human	rights	discourse.	More	than	being	simply	a	mirror	
however,	 they	 are	 a	 new	 kind	 of	 visual	 jurisprudence	 which	 bring	 together	 stories,	 ideas,	 and	
complexities	 to	 probe	 the	 notion	 of	what	 human	 dignity	means	 and	 how	 it	 can	 be	 achieved	 in	
contemporary	South	Africa.		
 	
South	Africa’s	Constitution	 is	 a	 forward-looking	document	 that	enshrines	 the	promise	of	human	
rights,	particularly	human	dignity	as	 its	 founding	value.	The	Constitutional	Court	seeks	to	uphold	
and	protect	these	rights	in	present-day	South	Africa.	By	contrast,	the	art	collection	looks	backward	
in	 order	 to	 move	 human	 dignity	 forward;	 it	 is	 a	 way	 of	 knowing	 human	 dignity	 differently.	 In	
                                                 
51 This	fact	is	deliberately	emphasised	by	the	curator	during	tours. 
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particular,	 the	 three	 artworks	 by	 Feni,	 Mason,	 and	 Goldblatt	 raise	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 visual	
jurisprudence	 of	 human	 dignity	 lies	 in	 the	 responsibility	 of	 those	 who	 are	 doing	 the	 looking.	
Reciprocity	 is	 important	 in	 recognising	 and	questioning	what	 it	means	 to	 uphold	 human	dignity	
against	 the	 ramifications	 of	 apartheid	 and	 historical	 injustice.	 Far	 from	 being	 utopian	 ideals	 of	
what	 human	 dignity	 should	 be,	 the	 artworks	 serve	 as	 reminders	 of	 past	 violations	 of	 human	
dignity,	underscored	by	a	norm	of	non-repetition.	In	doing	so,	the	art	collection	positions	human	
dignity	as	a	process;	a	utopia	still	‘out	there’.	This	sits	in	contrast	with	the	site	of	the	Court,	where	
its	 spatial	 transformation	 constitutes	 a	 utopia	 somewhere;	 an	 intentional	 realisation	 of	 human	
dignity	 in	 time	 and	 space.	 These	 tensions	 are	 important	 in	 understanding	 what	 human	 dignity	
means	and	entails	in	South	African	human	rights	discourse.		
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